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RiskAversion, Efficient Markets
and the Forward Exchange Rate
Kees G. Koedf/k and Mack Ott
ISK is acharacteristic of existence. Attempts to
avoid it explain such arrangements as insurance, lim-
ited liability firms and diversification of investment
portfolios. In recent years, risk aversion and the at-
tendant premium for risk-bearing have been used
increasingly to explain a stubborn paradox in the
empirical exchange rate literature: the failure of the
forward exchange rate to he an unbiased predictor of
the future spot exchange rate.
In this article, we review recent economic analyses
of the risk premium’s role in foreign exchange mar-
kets. The starting point is an explanation of covered
and uncovered interest parity and their relation to the
risk premium. We then turn to adiscussion of empiri-
cal tests of efficiency. In particular, we examine Iwo
recent papers that demonstrate the existence of the
risk premium but differ in their conclusions about




Currencies are exchanged, spot and forward, in
highly organized markets. Thehigh volume of trade 1w
competitive, well-informed individuals suggests that
the foreign exchange market fits Fama’s (1970; defini-
tion of an efficient market: A market in which prices
always fully reflect’ available information.” An analy-
sis offorward exchange market efficiency and the risk
premium draws on market information as revealed by
relations between interest differentials and exchange
rates. These relations are called the covered and un-
covered interest parity conditions.
Covered interest parity (CIP) relates the forward
premium (F’,— 5,1 to the interest differential,
~( j_~j*=
where
= logof I plus 13.5. three-month T-bill interest
rate,
= log of 1 plus foreign equivalent of T-hill
rate,
F, = log ofthe forward exchange rate (dollars
per foreign currency unitl,
5, = logof the spot exchange rate (dollars
per foreign currency unit(,
a = annualizing thctor — 12 divided by number- of
months in the forward contract.
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The right—hand side of fl, which is the annualized
forward premium on foreign currency, measures the
rate of return in domestic currency on a covered
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exchange pusition — that is. aspot purchase offoreign
currency offlietby a forwar-d sale. The equality with the
differential between the domestic and foreign interest
rate on the left-hand side is brought about by arbi-
trage: since the bonds are assumed to be default free
in their respective currencies, a riskless excess return
would be available if CIP did not hold.’
Because the forward rate is the present contractual
dollarprice offoreign currency for future delivery, the
assumptions of market efficiency and no risk pre-
mium imply a second form of interest pai-it~called
uncovered interest parity (UIP(. An expression fur VIP
can he obtained from the arbitrage condition which
equates the expected change in the spot rate plus the
premium for risk with the forward premium:
(2( E,[S,.kl—S, ±P. =
s.x’here
EjS, = the expectation of the period-t + k
spot rate based on period-t inforrna-
tion,
P = the risk premium for bearing the uncer—
taints’ of unexpected currency price
changes.
Under the no-risk-premium hypothesis,
(3; p,=0,
then, from (Ii, we have the second form of interest
parity, VIP:
(4( i — i’ = (E,[S, , k] — Sja.
Comparing equation 4 with equation 1, VIP implies
that the forwar-d rate, F’,, which is observable to the
market at time t, is equal to the market’s forecast of the
future spot exchange rate at time t+k. Note that un-
covered interest panty is conditional upon the hy-
pothesis of no risk premium; onE’ if ul holds will the
annualized rate of the expected change in spot rate be
equal to the current interest differential.
t’he risk premium~P,, on buying a cun’encv in the
forward market is implicitly defined by equation 2.
That is, individuals who do not \•vant to bear the
uncertainty of holding an open currency position buy
forward currency to hedge this risk. As shown in the
left—hand side of equation 2, the price these hedgers
pay includes the risk premium, the price of insuring
against this uncertainty. It is the difference bet~~’een
tIP hasbeen supported in a variety ofempirical investigations; see
Clinton (1987) and Isard 1987, pp. 7—8.
the log of the forsyar-d rate andthe log of the expected,
hut unobservable, future spot rate,
5 P, = F,— E[S,.~’,.
For- instance, ifthe risk premium is positive, specula-
tots sell foreign currency forward at price F, and ex-
pect to he able tobuy the foreign currency spot at time
+k for E,S. ~, profiting by doing so at rate P (annual
rate aP,(. Note that, if the risk premium is not zero, the
ntai-ket actually can expect the dollar to depreciate,
even though the observed interest differential and the
forward premium indicate an appreciation of the dol-
lar.’
Risk Premium or Market Inefficiency
Current investigations of the relationship between
the spot and forward exchange rates are premised on
a widely documented finding: the simple no-risk-
premium efficiency criterion, defined jointly by equa-
tions 2 and 3, has been refuted by many empirical
studies. Using a variety of assumptions, data, time
periods and estimation techniques, investigators have
established three fundamental points:
ii The forward exchange i-ate is not an unbiased pre-
dictor ofthe future spot rate.
z ‘rhe residuals obtained in a regression of spot ex-
change r-ates of their lagged forward rates liv-
quenttv exhibit serial conelation,
3) There exist systems filters; that permit profitable
sper:ulation in fur-eign exchange either through the
pur’cbase of foreign assets u•’ith offsetting forward
exchange sales or buy and hold strategies.
‘An example may clarify this relation among the premium, torward
rate and expected tuture spot rate, Suppose the dollar-OM spot
exchange rate is $.5512/DM, the three-month forward rate is
8.5494/CM, and the expectedfuturespot rate threemonths henceis
8.5556/CM. Since the risk premium is negative, the speculative
position wilt be against the dollar rather than against the CM. The
speculator (whose beliets are represented by the expected tuture
spot rate) would expect to make a profit by selling dollars torward
and buying DM assets. After holding the DM assets for three
months, the speculator anticipates selling the CM assets and using
the proceeds to buy dollars, The speculative rate ot profit — that is,
the excess over a hedged, secure return — anticipated over the
three months is, trom equation 2, 1.12 percent or4.49percenton an
annual basis:
{[E,(S, . ,)—S,l — [FrS,l}’ 4
= {lln(.5556)—lnC5512)l — [ln(.5494)—ln(.5512)l} 4
.0449
‘Thesecharacteristics have been widelydiscussed. For the biased-
ness of forward rates, see Robichek and Eaker (1978). Levich
(1979), Cumby and Obstfeld (1981), Hansen and Hodrick (1980)
and Meese and Rogoft (1983). The serial correlation ot errors has
been notedby Hansen and Hodrick (1980) andCumbyand Obstteld
(1984). On the existence of profitable speculation through “titters”
(obtained from lagged data) see Levich (1979), Bilson (1981) and
Sweeney (1986).
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Given the ample empit-ical evidence, most r-esearchers
accept the rejection of the simple no-risk-premium
efficiency criterion; however, they remain divided on
whether the existence of a risk premium or market
inefficiency is responsible for this result.
Why has it been so difficult to test for the presence
of a risk premium? The answer’ is that while, in gen-
eral, we do not have actual cx ante expectations data,
we assume that foreign exchange market participants
are rational in their- decisions, including their pricing
ofrisk. Hence, the expectation of the future spot rate is
equal to its actual, subsequently observed value plus a
random ertor and, perhaps, a risk premium. Conse-
quently, whenever the observable value of F,—S,~kis
different from zero, ther-e is cx post evidence on the
existence of a risk premium or market inefficienc or
both, but no direct evidence bearing on which.~
The empirical difficulties in assessing the presence
of a risk pt-emium fi-om simple calculations of F,—S,.,
can he gather-ed from chart 1. In this chart, we have
plotted the so-called ey post or rational expectations
risk premium, F—S. -‘ (annualized;, for the dollar/
deutsche mark exchange rate from January 1976
through June 1985. As is eyident, it is difficult to show
that the forward i-ate systematically underpr-edicts or
overptedicts the future spot rate. When long periods
oftime are consideted, the average prediction er-rot-of
the forward exchange rate is close to zero.Fortunately,
however, two direct tests for the presence of a risk
premium in the foreign exchange mar-ket have em-
erged from the liter-ature.
TWO TESTS OF EFFICIENCY AND
RISK PREMIA
Recently, two studies of exchange rates have offered
tests that sepat-ate the t-ational expectations hvpothe—
sis and the existence of arisk premium. These papei-s
use different methods, time periods and data sets, and
they arrive at clifferent conclusions about the relative
importance of the risk premium and expectation er-
rot’s.
‘Of course, this is conditional on expectations being rationally
formed, Even so, unforeseen events transpiring between time t and
+‘k may result in F,—S,K ± 0. Such unforeseen events, dubbed
“news” by Frenkel (1981) explains some variation in F,—S,,,due
neither to a risk premium nor nonrational expectations; however,
news should not result in biased expectations since unforeseen
events must have an expected meaflof zero.
The first paper is F’ama’s 1984) article, which as-
sesses the relative variability of the risk pr’emium and
forecast errors during 1973—82. Fama concludes that
the risk premium explains more of the var’iance than
the forecast error does.Fur1her-more, he also finds that
the i-isk premium and the expected (but unobserved;
futur-e spot rates at-c negatively crt-related.
The second paper, Frankel and Froot (1986;, uses
the median response from survey data of foreign ex-
change traders’ expectations of future spot rates.’
Their study, primarily covering 1981—85, finds a risk
premium varying between 3 percent and 10 percent
depending on the currency observed. Thus, they are
able to test directly the rational expectations hypothe-
sis and to estimate the proportion of the forward rate
error’ that can be ascribed to forecast error and to risk
premia.
Their findings concur with Fama’s in two respects
— the risk premium is significant and negatively cor-
related with the expected future spot rate — but
diverge in terms of the relative variances of forecast
errors and risk premia:
In all three surveys, the errors exhibit unconditional
bias ofa sign opposite to estimates ofther’isk premium
from the survey data. The premia are large in absolute
value, and are statistically different from zero. We can
reject the hypothesis that systematic unconditional
mistakes made by the forward r-ate in predicting the
future spot r’ateare due entir’elv to a failure ofrational
expectations. But atthe other extreme, the hypothesis
that the forward rate prediction errors can be ex-
plained by the risk premium alone is also r’ejected.
Expected depreciation is more variable than both the
forwar-d discount and the risk premium. The first find-
ing corroborates Fama’s 1984) conjecture that ex-
pected depr’eciation and the risk premium are nega-
tively correlated. ‘t’he second finding rejects the
hypothesis that the variance of expected depreciation
is less thanthe variance ofrisk pr-emium
‘Frankel and Froot used three different surveys: Money Market
Services (MMS), Inc., biweekly January 1983—October 1984,
weekly 1984—86, polled an average of 30 currency traders or
economists atmajor international banks; The Economist Financial
Report every six weeks June 1981—December 1985 conducted
telephone interviews with currency traders at 14 leading interna-
tional banks; finally, Amex Bank Review 1976—85 annually sur-
veyed 250—300 central and private bankers, corporate officers and
economists. In each case, respondents were asked for exchange
rateforecasts atvarious horizons for the pound,mark, Swiss franc,
yen and (except for MMS) French franc. Details of these surveys
can be found in the data appendix of Frankel and Froot (1987), p.
151.
°Frankeland Froot(1986), p. 29. Originally, this negative correlation
was presented by Fama (1984) as a puzzle; however, as shown in
Hodrick and Srivastava (1986), it is perfectly consistent with the
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Assessing the Divergent Findings
ofFama and Frankel-Eroot
The two papers, which use very different methodo-
log~es,concur in the statistical significance of a risk
premium, but are in dispute about its economic
significance. Onthe one hand Farna’s paper, as well as
others whose research has followed his lead, asserts
that the risk premium accounts for most of the for-
wardrate error.7 An implication is that theefficiency of
forward exchange markets is not refuted.A corollary of
this implication is that, since foreignexchange trading
is not subject to biased forecasts, policy intervention
in foreignexchange markets cannot be justified on the
existence ofdestabilizing and misguided speculation.
In contrast, the findings of Frankel and F’root assert
that, although the risk premium is statistically signi-
ficant, it is smaller in absolute value and vanabilityj
than the forward rate forecast errors made by the
surveyed traders, economists and corporate officers of
international banks. Moreover, they find that the ex-
pectations of these surveyed traders are systernati-
cally biased, that their speculative activity is excessive
and that the risk premium is without econonuc
significance:
‘rho data continue to rejeC statistically the hypothesis
of rational ex
1
jectauons ... iii favor ofthe alternative of
excessive speculation... Put diflei-enUv, even after oh
owing br’ measuiemem citOt’, it s still not possible to
ujout the hypothesis that all the bias co,isists of iv-
pcaird e~x;x,ct;i:wnaIerrors made In’ survey rc,spon-
(1(3~IIS a,icl f/iRt ‘10 positive portion of the bias can be
attr,bv:td to the ~survev risk prefnn,m.~
These disparate findings require some resolution.
Besides the different statistical methodologies used
there are two fundamental differences between their
analyses. First, the two papers use different data sets
for their empirical tests: Farna’s study cover-s data
ohsen’ed at four-week inteivals fl-ow August 1973
through December 198Z, while Frankel-Froot’s data
are of varying frequency over primarily 1981—85.’ Fa-
ma’s sample covers nine exchange rates, including the
six that Frankel-Froot examine. Second, the F’rankel-
Front study uses survey data rather than the ex post
market observations for the expectation proxy. This
7For example, see Hodrick and Srivastava (1986). Frenkel (1986)
and Boothe and Longworth (1986).
SFrankS and Froot (1986), p. 28, emphasisadded.
~FrankeI-Froot do reportsomeearlier data (1976—78), but the bulk of
theirtests are on data from the 1 980s,
creates some problems of interpretation, as FrankeJ—
Froot recognize.’0 While the measurement errors can
be statistically addressed, there are three economic
differences between survey opinion and market
actions that warrant consideration in weighing the
conflicting results ofFama and Frankel and Froot.
Survey responses may deviate from market expecta-~
tions first because a single observation rather than a
weighted average forms the datum. That is, Frankel-
Froot use the median response to represent the tvpi-
cal market agent. in contrast, when expectations are
deduced from market actions (actual portfolio post-
lions or changes in position), theexpectations ofevery
active agent are included in a composite average with
the weights being asset holdings or changes in asset
holdings. This population-weighted, distribution~
based expectation may differ considerably from the
median proxy especially ifthe tails of the expectation
distribution contain the beliefs of the agents making
thelargest purchases. Ifdifferences ofopinions as well
as changes in information move markets, then median
survey responses will offer incomplete guides to mar-
ket expectations.
A related, but slightly different aspect ofthe differ-
ence between survey and market data is that the latter
is substantiated by action. Surveys are frequently mi&-
leading in that agents are not disciplined in their
responses by having to take positions that risk wealth.
Put differently actions speak louder than words, or
talk is cheap.
Finally, the survey responses may not be expected
values but rather modal values — the most likely
values — oi~perhaps, risk-adjusted expectations. For
example, Frankel-Froot 1986) describe each of their
three data sets in about the same form as the Money
Market Services (MMS) survey:
Every two weeks from .Januaiy 1983 to October 19S4,
MMS spoke by phone with an average of 30 currency
traders or cuirency-iooni economists at major inter’-
national banks. Respondents were asked for their ex-
pectations of thevajue ofthe pound, mark, Swiss franc
and yen against the dollar’ in two weeks and three
months time. From October 1984 to February 1986,
MMS conducted ~ts survey eveIy week, asking for ex-
pectations one week and one month into the future
p. 4).
For normally distributed future spot rates, such ambi-
guity would not mattet- since mode and mean are
equal; if the distributions are asymmetric, however,
lOFranke~.f root(1986), p.4.
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mode and mean are unequal.” Consequently the re-
spondents interpretations become important, and
changes in the median respondent, the identity ofthe
responding institutions ortheir spokesman makes the
interpretation ofsurvey expectations even moreprob-
lematic.
Since these are unavoidable properties of survey
data, they cloud the interpretation of survey~based
findings. The othertwo possible sources ofthe dispat—
ity between thefindings — different data and different
timeperiods — can be tested. ForFarna’sstudy, reesti-
mation of the model will determine whether, over the
latter period on the same data, his results still diverge
from those of Frankel and Froot. Thus, in the next
section, we reestimate Farna’s model over a period
including the 1981—85 period and use the same data
source as Frankel and Fmot.’2
FAMA’S TEST FOR A VARIABLE RISK
PREMIUM, AN EXTENSION
Fama’s 19841 test for a variable risk premium de-
composes the forward premium (FL~Sjinto its two
components: the expected change in the spot i-ate
IES and the risk premium P1 as shown in equa-
tion 2. Fama then consider-s two n3gi-essions using the
foiward premium as the explanatoiy variable and
each of the two components of the foiward premium
— the forwaj-d rate error, F’,—S, - and the actual change
in the spot rate, S. —S — as dependent variables:
(61 F~—51
= al + bliF—Si ±ci,
(7) S,1—S, = aZ + bZ(F—S! + eZ.
In these regression equations, b2 estimates the accu-
racy of the forward premium in predidling the actual
change in the spot rate, whereas bi reveals the risk
premium component of the forward premium. Since
the premium and forward rate errors may have non-
zero covariance, the coefficients in (61 and (7) cannot
he used directly to measure the proportion of varia-
tion due to risk and forecast errors, but the difference
between them does provide some information.
The difference between the two estimated coef-
ficients, bi —hz), provides statistical evidence on the
proportional importance of variation in the risk pre-
mium vs. variation in the rational future spot rate
forecast error as sources of variation in the forward
premium. Specifically, ifbi — bZ is positive and statisti-
callv significant, most of the variation in fotward pre-
mium is due to variation in the risk premium.4 Con-
versely, if hi — b2 is negative and statistically
significant, most of the variation is due to variation in
the expected change in the exchange rate. Finally, if
hi — b2 is not significant, it is not possible to draw any










.~ —~S,) ) * coy (P,, E,(S — S,) )
iThal is, when distributions are not symmetric, the differentstatistics
that survey respondents might interpret as expectations’ will be
wid&y divergent. When thstributions of future spot exchange rates
are symmetric, the mean and mode (most likely future exchange
rate) are the same. Also, Ihe odd moments of a symmethc d~stribu-
tion are zero, so that skewness could not influence a survey respon-
dents answer. If distributions are asymmetric, however, the mean
and mode will diverge and nonzero skewness (the third moment of
the distribution) nhluence the risk premium and, hence, the survey
response. Forexample, consider two alternativedistributions for the
DM one month in the future:
I. Symmetric Distribution (likelihood)
$667 (10%). $606 (80%), $545 (10%).
II. Asymmetric Distribution (likelihood)
$667 (20%), $606 (80%)
In each distribution, the mode is $606. which is aiso the mean of I
but, the mean of II is $618. Thus, the statistEc that respondents
repoitastheft expected va~ue matters for distribution U, but does not
matter for distrthutEon I.
2Frankel and Froot (1986) use spot and forward exchange ratedata
from DRL while Fama (1984) uses data from Harris Trust Nafion&
Bank of Chicago. In the results reported fl tables I and 2, we use
DRI data.
3As shown in Fama (1984), p. 21. by assumption of rational expecta-
tions,








Since the covariance term appears in the bi and b2 regression
coefficients, neither bi nor b2 can be used by itself to assess the
relative contribution of risk or forecast error to the forward premium;
however, since they have a common denominator, r2(F,~S),the
difference between bi and b2, which does not contain this term in
the numerator, can be used to provide evidence about the propor-
tional contribution or riskand forecast error,
(12(P) — (T1(E(S~~ , ‘— S,)
bl—b2
fl.2 (F, — S,)
l4The standard error of bi — b2 istwice the common standard errorof
bi and b2: Since (6) and (7) mp~y that b,± b2
= 1, by definition of
the variance of b,
T(b ~-b2) [E(b, — b, — (b2— b2) )2]V2
[E(b, - - (1 - 6.) + (I b1) )91/2
= 2a(b).
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One possible reason that different sample pei-iods
Fama 1973-82; Frankel-Froot, 1981—85)yield different
results is that the structure of markets was’ have
changed during or between these periods. Econo-
mists have argued that the so-called peso problem
makes the 1973—76 period difficult to intcTpret±0th—
ei-s have aigued that the development of foreign ex-
change markets, learning curvebehavior ofagents and
the evolution offloating exchange rate policy are other
reasons why subpenods may differ in structure. In
partiuular, sevei-aI authors have presented evidence
that a change in the monetai-v 1-egirne in the United
States during the last quarter of1979 may have caused
a sliuctural change.~ Consequently, we have esti-
mated Fama’s model, equations C and 7, over all COW—
binations of the three subperiods of 1976.01—1985,06:
1~Thepeso problem refers to the deva(uation of the Mexican peso
which was anUcipated throughout the 1973—76 period and which
occurred n ear’y 1976. More generauy, it refers to any anticipated
exogenous event that does not occur within the sample period. See
Krasker (1979) and lsard (1987).
6See Isard (1987).
“‘For example, see Ott and Veugelers (1956) and Frenkel (1986).
before ~B), dut-ing (DY and since (SI the interval of
monetary aggi-egate targeting, 1979.1O—198Z.O9,’~
F-statistics for tests of these structural breaks over
the 1976—85 period against the null hypothesis of no
breaks are reported in table 1. These Chow tests are
used to determine the proper estimation subperiods
to be reported in table 2. Asthe first column oltablé 1
indicates, Canada, France, Italy Japan and Switzer-
land do not i-eject the hill-period structural stability
hypothesis, and their regression estimates in table 2
are for the undivided full period, indicated by
B + I) + S. Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the
Uniled Kingdom reject the null hypothesis at the 5
percent level or better, and their regression estimates
are reported by the appropriate subperiods.’~
Table 2 reports the regression estimates of (6) and (7)
for the nine currencies whose structures were exam-
ined in table 1. Overall, the bi —b2 test reported in the
ThThe ater starting dale also avoids the peso probtem; see Krasker
(1979).
‘~tnte~estingly. the data for none of the countries supported the
afternative hypothesis that the Before and Since subperiods were
the same. Germany and B&gium provided evidence that all three
periods were d~ssjmilar, white the Netherlands and the United King-
dom indicated that the Before and During subperiods were similar
but ointly different from the Sincesubperiod.
Fama’s Specjfication Estimated by
Subperiods, 1976—85
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last column reasserts the relative importance of the
risk premium that Fama found in his original tests.
This result holds both for currencies that revealed
structurally differentiated subperiods and for curren-
cies that did not, that is, Canada, Italy, Japan and
Switzerland. Of the nine currencies only the Belgian
francand the French franc failed to support the statis-
ticallygreater importance oIthe risk premium over the
expected change in the exchange rate.zO The other
results reported in table 2 indicate that the results are
quantitatively sirn~1arto those reported by Farna for
the same currencies over a shorter sample and differ-
ent data set.
CONCLUSION
Markets for foreign exchange are well-organized,
high-volume interactions that encompass the trading
activities of many competitive profit-seeking agents.
That is, they appear similar in many functional as-
20But even for Beigkim and France, the difference bl — b2 was posi-
tive so that forecast error variance was not greater than riskpreniia
variance for anycurrency.
pects to other (domestic) financial markets so thatthe
hypothesis of efficiency is plausible. Empirical tests,
however, have rejected the joint hypothesis of market
efficiency and no risk premium in the foreign ex~
change market. That is, while CIP holds, UIPdoes not.
Consequently, the role of the risk premium in for-
eign exchange markets often was not distinguishable
from market inefficiency until Fama’s 1984) analysis
provided a test of its importance in the foreign ex-
change market. Frankel and Front (19861 have pro-
vided survey~based evidence that also supports the
existence of a risk premium but conflicts with Fama’s
assessment of the risk premium’s economic impor-
tance. We have replicated Fama’s study for an ex-
tended sample period and, although the results varied
substantially by subperiods, found results that in gen-
eial corroborate Farna’s findings. What this impasse
suggests is that the economic significance of the risk
premium will not be resolved by tests of its existence
but may require direct modelling of the portfolio
choice problem from which it arises2’
21 For an application of portfolio choice theory to this prob’em, see
Bomhotf and Koedijk (1987).
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